This paper was aimed at investigating the development and validation of a new measure of private self-consciousness: the Self-Reflection and Insight Scale (SRIS). Self-Reflection, the inspection and evaluation of one's thoughts, feelings and behavior and insight, the clarity of understanding of one's thoughts, feelings and behavior, are metacognitive factors central to the process of purposeful, directed change (Carver & Scheier, 1998). Purposeful progress through the cycle of self-regulation towards a specific goal rests on an individual’s ability to monitor and evaluate his/her progress and use such feedback to improve his/her performance (Figure 1).

The PrSCS is a 10-item measure assessing individuals' tendency to direct attention inwards (Fenigstein et al., 1975). There have been a number of psychometric problems associated with the PrSCS. For example, although some factor analytical studies have found support for a unidimensional structure (Britt, 1992), it is now generally accepted that the PrSCS is comprised of two subscales; internal state (PrSCS-ISA) and self-reflection (PrSCS-SR).

The database PsycINFO lists over 280 papers related to the PrSCS, yet only 12 of these have discussed the distinction between internal state awareness and self-reflection and there has been some disagreement as to the specific items that comprise each subscale (Anderson, Bohon, & Berrigan, 1996; Burnkrant & Page, 1984; Chang, 1998; Conway & Giannopoulos, 1993; Creed & Funder, 1998; 1999; Kingree & Ruback, 1996; Mittal & Balasubramanian, 1987; Piliavin & Charng, 1988; Ruganci, 1995; Silvia, 1999; Watson, Morris, Ramsey, & Hickman, 1996).

In addition, it has been argued that the items of the PrSCS-SR do not accurately capture the essence of self-reflection because PrSCS-SR has been found to correlate positively and significantly with measures of psychopathology. It has been argued that this kind of psychopathology could be expected from rumination, rather than from a constructive self-reflection, and that the PrSCS-SR may be tapping a negative or dysfunctional self-absorption rather than measuring a constructive self-reflection (Anderson et al., 1996).

The PrSCS-SR confounds motive to self-reflect with the actual direction of attention towards the self (Trapnell & Campbell, 1999). This is an important conceptual issue as a motive to perform a specific act and the execution of that act are logically independent. It may be that this fundamental conceptual confound is another reason that the PrSCS-SR scale has performed inconsistently in past research. This paper is the first to examine the relationship between these two factors.

The PrSCS-ISA correlates negatively with anxiety and depression (Watson et al., 1996). As insight is related to internal state awareness, scores on the insight scale of the SRIS (SRIS-IN) should be negatively correlated with depression, anxiety and stress. Predictions about the relationship between the self-reflection scale of the SRIS (SRIS-SR) and psychopathology are not so clear. If the SRIS-SR avoids tapping the rumination associated with the PrSCS-SR, then the SRIS-SR should not correlate with measures of psychopathology. Because it was not known a priori if the SRIS-SR would ‒ in fact ‒ avoid tapping a ruminative style of self-reflection, no specific predictions were made.

Internal state awareness and the related construct of insight are associated with the ability to identify and express feelings. Alexithymic individuals have a limited capacity to identify and express feelings (Loiselle & Dawson, 1988). Thus the SRIS-IN should be negatively correlated with measures of alexithymia.

The processes of self-reflection and insight are logically independent. One may spend considerable time in self-reflection without gaining insight. Thus no specific predictions were made about the correlation between self-reflection and alexithymia.

Goal attainment and self-regulatory processes demand cognitive flexibility. Cognitive flexibility refers to an individual's: a) awareness that there are options and alternative courses of action available in any given situation, b) willingness to be flexible and adapt to the situation, and c) self-efficacy in being flexible (Martin & Rubin, 1995). Thus it was hypothesized that there would be a positive correlation between both the self-reflection and insight scales of the SRIS and cognitive flexibility.

As reflection and insight are central to the self-regulatory process (see Figure 1), both scales of the SRIS should correlate positively with measures of self-regulation, and individuals who regularly monitor their thoughts, feelings and behaviors should have higher levels of insight and self-reflection. As journal or diary-keeping requires the self-monitoring of thoughts, feelings and behavior, responses of individuals who kept journals or diaries were compared with those who did not keep journals.

This paper reports three studies. The first study reported on an initial factor analysis of the SRIS. The second examined test-retest reliability. The third examined convergent validity of the SRIS. This final study also compared the responses of individuals who kept journals with those of individuals who did not, and included a second factor analysis of the SRIS.

Participants and Procedure Two hundred and sixty undergraduate psychology students participated for course credit (127 women and 117 men ‒ 16 participants did not indicate their gender; mean age = 20.58 years). Questionnaires were completed in small group settings using a six-point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 6 = strongly agree).

The final factorial solution revealed two factors which were labeled Insight and Self-Reflection. Both scales had good internal consistency and performed better in this respect than the PrSCS-SR and the PrSCS-ISA, given that Anderson et al. (1996) reported Cronbach alphas of .63 (PrSCS-SR) and .56 (PrSCS-ISA). In accord with previous work (Creed & Funder, 1998) there were no differences between male and female scores.

The finding that the SRIS-SR and SRIS-IN were not correlated (r = -.03) appears to run counter to the generic model of self-regulation (Figure 1), which predicts a positive correlation between self-reflection and insight. Previous work has found that the relationship between SR and ISA is ambiguous (e.g., Burnkrant & Page, 1984) and this issue is further explored in Study 3.

An important and original finding of this study is that “need for self-reflection” and “engagement in self-reflection” loaded on the same factor. There has been considerable inconsistency in the research into private self-consciousness using the PrSCS, and it has been generally thought that these inconsistencies are due to the use of the PrSCS as a unidirectional measure when in all probability it is bidimensional. A less discussed issue with the PrSCS is the confounding of the motive or need for self-reflection with the actual engagement in self-reflective acts. Clearly these are logically separate factors. However, the present study has found that they appear to be inextricably connected.

The SRIS-IN demonstrated good convergent and discriminant validity. It negatively correlated with measures of depression, anxiety, stress and alexithymia, and correlated positively with cognitive flexibility and self-regulation. The SRIS-SR, which was designed to measure a constructive style of self-reflection, was not related to depression. However, positive correlations between the SRISSR and measures of anxiety were found. Based on previous arguments (e.g., Creed & Funder, 1998) this may indicate that the SRIS-SR may be tapping a dysfunctional rumination or self-focused style of self-reflection.

Individuals can engage in self-reflection in a number of different ways. For some people self-reflection may be akin to an automatic appraisal process, requiring little or no overt effort (Ekman, 1992). For others, self-reflection may require conscious application of effort, and there is some evidence that individuals prone to anxiety tend to utilize a conscious and purposeful approach to self-reflection (Mansell, 2000).

To examine the effect of conscious and purposeful self-reflection or self-monitoring on levels of insight and self-reflection, the responses of individuals who kept a journal or diary in which they wrote about their thoughts and feelings were compared with those who did not keep a journal or diary.

A correlational analysis found the correlations between the SRIS-IN and SRIS-SR differed for those who did and did not keep journals. For journal-keepers there was a nonsignificant correlation between the SRIS-IN and SRIS-SR (r = -.08, p = .63), and there was a significant negative correlation for participants who did not keep diaries (r = -.37, p = .001).

This suggests that one confounding factor in previous research investigating the relationship between self-reflection and insight may be the extent to which participants engage in acts of conscious and purposeful self-reflection.

With regard to the differences for group means, contrary to predictions, diary or journal-keeping was not associated with increased levels of insight; participants who did not keep diaries in fact had higher scores on the SRIS-IN. As expected, individuals who had kept journals had significantly higher scores on the SRIS-SR scale, a finding which provides further and unique support for the validity of the SRIS-SR scale.

There are a number of possible explanations for the unexpected findings. For those who did not keep journals, it could be that these individuals (who had higher levels of insight than did journal-keepers) did not engage in the kind of conscious and purposeful self-reflection measured by the SRIS-SR. For such individuals the self-reflection process and the experience of insight may be automatic rather than deliberate.

For individuals who did keep journals, it could be that these individuals were not explicitly keeping them in order to increase their levels of insight. Indeed, Burt (1994) found that diary-keeping was often used as a means of providing an outlet for expressing thoughts, feelings, and emotions ‒ a strategy for discharging unpleasant emotions, rather than an explicit means of gaining insight. Thus, it may be that participants who kept a journal were in some way stuck in a process of self-focused self-reflection and self-examination.

The idea that journal-keeping participants in the present study were in some way stuck in a process of self-focused self-reflection has some support also from past work on the Transtheoretical Model of Change (Prochaska & DiClemente, 1984). Individuals who have difficulty in making changes tend to spend more time thinking about their emotional reactions and ruminating on their problems than actually focusing on solutions and attempting to change their behavior. Indeed, Lyubomirsky, Tucker, Caldwell, and Berg (1999) found that dysphoric self-reflection is characterized by a focus on the negative emotional aspects of personal problems rather than on a constructive problem-solving approach. Thus, such individuals may well lack the skills or resources to move from self-reflection through to action and insight (Grimley & Lee, 1997).

The findings that journal-keeping is not associated with increased insight and self-regulation, and that there is not a positive correlation between the SRIS-SR and SRIS-IN scales, appear to run counter to the self-regulatory model presented in Figure 1. Thus, this model may need some revision.

This discussion suggests that there are different kinds of self-reflection involved in the self-regulatory cycle and goal attainment. In relation to coping with stress, Lazarus and Folkman (1984) distinguish between a problem-focused and an emotion-focused coping style. Adapting the approach of Lazarus and Folkman for use in the present study, we can speculate that there are at least two types of self-reflection.

One type may be a productive problem-solving or solution-focused approach in which individuals constructively reflect on how best to reach their goals. The other type may be a self-focused approach in which individuals attempt to understand, contain or dissipate their negative emotional, cognitive and behavioral reactions, rather than focusing on moving towards goal attainment.

This notion differentiates between problem-solving self-reflection (PS-SR) and self-focused self-reflection (SF-SR). The term self-focused self-reflection is used here in preference to the term emotion-focused, because this type of self-reflection involves a focus on more than just emotions - it includes reflection on cognitions and also on behavior.

Of course, individuals are likely to use both styles of self-reflection to some extent, although they also tend to show a preference for one style over the other. The conjoint use of problem- and self-focused coping style is commonplace. For example, in an analysis of 1,332 episodes of coping with a wide range of life issues, Folkman and Lazarus (1980) found that in 98% of the episodes both problem- and emotion-focused coping styles were used.

According to this revised conceptualization, individuals who engage in SF-SR are less likely to progress through the cycle of self-regulation towards goal attainment. Such individuals would be more engaged in SF-SR than in PS-SR. One would thus expect that SF-SR would be associated with difficulties in reaching goals.

If this were the case then it can be hypothesized that as individuals systematically work towards the attainment of a specific goal which they had previously been unable to attain (and this lack of attainment was due in part to being overly engaged in SF-SR), their levels of insight would increase whilst their levels of self-focused self-reflection would decrease. The present study could not test this hypothesis, but such a study would provide useful insights into the metacognitive factors involved in purposeful behavioral change such as that which occurs in clinical or coaching practice.

There are a number of other limitations in the present series of studies. These studies employed a relatively small and homogeneous sample drawn from an undergraduate student population. Thus it is not clear to what extent these findings will generalize across age and educational status. Future research should seek to extend these findings with other populations. Further, the journal-keeping participants were self-selected. Thus it is not clear whether the observed differences in levels of self-reflection and insight are specifically related to journal-keeping, or to some other factors.

It is of interest, however, that Accardo, Aboyoun, Alford and Cannon (1996) found there were no significant differences in scores on personality inventories between those who kept diaries and those who did not. Future research should investigate these issues and also seek to extend the SRIS and develop scales which further differentiate between SF-SR and PS-SR.

Accardo, C. M., Aboyoun, D. C., Alford, B. A., & Cannon, J. T. (1996). Diaries: Who keeps them and why. Perceptual & Motor Skills, 82(2), 559-562.

Anderson, E. M., Bohon, L. M., & Berrigan, L. P. (1996). Factor structure of the Private Self-Consciousness Scale. Journal of Personality Assessment, 66(1), 144-152.

Bagby, R. M., Parker, J. D. A., & Taylor, G. J. (1994). The twenty-item Toronto Alexithymia scale I: Item selection and cross validation of the factor structure. Journal of Psychosomatic Research, 38(1), 23-32.

Britt, T. W. (1992). The Self-Consciousness Scale: On the stability of the three-factor structure. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 18(6), 748-755.

Burnkrant, R. E., & Page, T. J. (1984). A modification of the Fenigstein, Scheier, and Buss Self-Consciousness Scales. Journal of Personality Assessment, 48(6), 629-637.

Burt, C. D. B. (1994). An analysis of a self-initiated coping behavior: Diary-keeping. Child Study Journal, 24(3), 171-189.

Carver, C. S., & Scheier, M. F. (1998). On the self-regulation of behavior. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Chang, L. (1998). Factor interpretations of the Self-Consciousness Scale. Personality & Individual Differences, 24(5), 635-640.

Conway, M., & Giannopoulos, C. (1993). Self-esteem and specificity in self-focused attention. Journal of Social Psychology, 133(1), 121-123.

Creed, A. T., & Funder, D. C. (1998). The two faces of private self-consciousness: Self report, peer-report, and behavioral correlates. European Journal of Personality, 12(6), 411-431.

Creed, A. T., & Funder, D. C. (1999). Shining the light on private self-consciousness: A response to Silvia (1999). European Journal of Personality, 13(6), 539-542.

Ekman, P. (1992). An argument for basic emotions. Cognition and Emotion, 6(3-4), 169-200.

Fenigstein, A., Scheier, M. F., & Buss, A. H. (1975). Public and private self-consciousness: Assessment and theory. Journal of Counseling and Clinical Psychology, 43(4), 522-527.

Folkman, S., & Lazarus, R. S. (1980). An analysis of coping in a middle-aged community sample. Journal of Health and Social Behavior, 21(3), 219-239.

Grant, A. M. (2001). Rethinking psychological mindedness: Metacognition self-reflection and insight. Behaviour Change, 18(1), 8-17.

Grimley, D. M., & Lee, P. A. (1997). Condom and other contraceptive use among a random sample of female adolescents: A snapshot in time. Adolescence, 32(128), 771-779.

Kingree, J. B., & Ruback, R. B. (1996). Reconceptualizing the Private Self-Consciousness subscale. Social Behavior and Personality: An international journal, 24(1), 1-8.

Lazarus, R. S., & Folkman, S. (1984). Stress, appraisal and coping. New York: Springer-Verlag.

Loiselle, C. G., & Dawson, C. (1988). Toronto Alexithymia Scale: Relationships with measures of patient self-disclosure and private self-consciousness. Psychotherapy and Psychosomatics, 50(2), 109-116.

Lovibond, S. H., & Lovibond, P. F. (1995). Manual for the Depression Anxiety Stress Scales. Sydney: Psychology Foundation of Australia.

Lyubomirsky, S., Tucker, K. L., Caldwell, N. D., & Berg, K. (1999). Why ruminators are poor problem solvers: Clues from the phenomenology of dysphoric rumination. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 77(5), 1041-1060.

Mansell, W. (2000). Conscious appraisal and the modification of automatic processes in anxiety. Behavioural and Cognitive Psychotherapy, 28(2), 99-120.

Martin, M. W., & Rubin, R. B. (1995). A new measure of cognitive flexibility. Psychological Reports, 76, 623-626.

Mittal, B., & Balasubramanian, S. K. (1987). Testing the dimensionality of the self-consciousness scales. Journal of Personality Assessment, 51(1), 53-68.

Piliavin, J. A., & Charng, H. (1988). What is the factorial structure of the private and public self-consciousness scales? Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 14(3), 587-595.

Prochaska, J. O., & DiClemente, C. C. (1984). Toward a comprehensive model of change. In J. O. Prochaska & C. C. DiClemente (Eds.), The transtheoretical approach: Crossing the traditional boundaries of therapy. Homewood, IL: Dow-Jones.

Rosenbaum, M. (1980). A schedule for assessing self-control behaviors: Preliminary findings. Behavior Therapy, 11(1), 109-121.

Ruganci, R. N. (1995). Private and public self-consciousness subscales of the Fenigstein, Scheier and Buss self-consciousness scale: A Turkish translation. Personality and Individual Differences, 18(2), 279-282.

Silvia, P. J. (1999). Explaining personality or explaining variance? A comment on Creed and Funder (1998). European Journal of Personality, 13(6), 533-538.

Trapnell, P. D., & Campbell, J. D. (1999). Private self-consciousness and the five-factor model of personality: Distinguishing rumination from reflection. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 76(2), 284-304.

Watson, P. J., Morris, R. J., Ramsey, A., & Hickman, S. E. (1996). Further contrasts between self-reflectiveness and internal state awareness factors of private self-consciousness. Journal of Psychology, 130(2), 183-192.

Accardo, C. M., Aboyoun, D. C., Alford, B. A., & Cannon, J. T. (1996). Diaries: Who keeps them and why. Perceptual & Motor Skills, 82(2), 559-562.

Anderson, E. M., Bohon, L. M., & Berrigan, L. P. (1996). Factor structure of the Private Self-Consciousness Scale. Journal of Personality Assessment, 66(1), 144-152.

Bagby, R. M., Parker, J. D. A., & Taylor, G. J. (1994). The twenty-item Toronto Alexithymia scale I: Item selection and cross validation of the factor structure. Journal of Psychosomatic Research, 38(1), 23-32.

Britt, T. W. (1992). The Self-Consciousness Scale: On the stability of the three-factor structure. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 18(6), 748-755.

Burnkrant, R. E., & Page, T. J. (1984). A modification of the Fenigstein, Scheier, and Buss Self-Consciousness Scales. Journal of Personality Assessment, 48(6), 629-637.

Burt, C. D. B. (1994). An analysis of a self-initiated coping behavior: Diary-keeping. Child Study Journal, 24(3), 171-189.

Carver, C. S., & Scheier, M. F. (1998). On the self-regulation of behavior. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Chang, L. (1998). Factor interpretations of the Self-Consciousness Scale. Personality & Individual Differences, 24(5), 635-640.

Conway, M., & Giannopoulos, C. (1993). Self-esteem and specificity in self-focused attention. Journal of Social Psychology, 133(1), 121-123.

Creed, A. T., & Funder, D. C. (1998). The two faces of private self-consciousness: Self report, peer-report, and behavioral correlates. European Journal of Personality, 12(6), 411-431.

Creed, A. T., & Funder, D. C. (1999). Shining the light on private self-consciousness: A response to Silvia (1999). European Journal of Personality, 13(6), 539-542.

Ekman, P. (1992). An argument for basic emotions. Cognition and Emotion, 6(3-4), 169-200.

Fenigstein, A., Scheier, M. F., & Buss, A. H. (1975). Public and private self-consciousness: Assessment and theory. Journal of Counseling and Clinical Psychology, 43(4), 522-527.

Folkman, S., & Lazarus, R. S. (1980). An analysis of coping in a middle-aged community sample. Journal of Health and Social Behavior, 21(3), 219-239.

Grant, A. M. (2001). Rethinking psychological mindedness: Metacognition self-reflection and insight. Behaviour Change, 18(1), 8-17.

Grimley, D. M., & Lee, P. A. (1997). Condom and other contraceptive use among a random sample of female adolescents: A snapshot in time. Adolescence, 32(128), 771-779.

Kingree, J. B., & Ruback, R. B. (1996). Reconceptualizing the Private Self-Consciousness subscale. Social Behavior and Personality: An international journal, 24(1), 1-8.

Lazarus, R. S., & Folkman, S. (1984). Stress, appraisal and coping. New York: Springer-Verlag.

Loiselle, C. G., & Dawson, C. (1988). Toronto Alexithymia Scale: Relationships with measures of patient self-disclosure and private self-consciousness. Psychotherapy and Psychosomatics, 50(2), 109-116.

Lovibond, S. H., & Lovibond, P. F. (1995). Manual for the Depression Anxiety Stress Scales. Sydney: Psychology Foundation of Australia.

Lyubomirsky, S., Tucker, K. L., Caldwell, N. D., & Berg, K. (1999). Why ruminators are poor problem solvers: Clues from the phenomenology of dysphoric rumination. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 77(5), 1041-1060.

Mansell, W. (2000). Conscious appraisal and the modification of automatic processes in anxiety. Behavioural and Cognitive Psychotherapy, 28(2), 99-120.

Martin, M. W., & Rubin, R. B. (1995). A new measure of cognitive flexibility. Psychological Reports, 76, 623-626.

Mittal, B., & Balasubramanian, S. K. (1987). Testing the dimensionality of the self-consciousness scales. Journal of Personality Assessment, 51(1), 53-68.

Piliavin, J. A., & Charng, H. (1988). What is the factorial structure of the private and public self-consciousness scales? Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 14(3), 587-595.

Prochaska, J. O., & DiClemente, C. C. (1984). Toward a comprehensive model of change. In J. O. Prochaska & C. C. DiClemente (Eds.), The transtheoretical approach: Crossing the traditional boundaries of therapy. Homewood, IL: Dow-Jones.

Rosenbaum, M. (1980). A schedule for assessing self-control behaviors: Preliminary findings. Behavior Therapy, 11(1), 109-121.

Ruganci, R. N. (1995). Private and public self-consciousness subscales of the Fenigstein, Scheier and Buss self-consciousness scale: A Turkish translation. Personality and Individual Differences, 18(2), 279-282.

Silvia, P. J. (1999). Explaining personality or explaining variance? A comment on Creed and Funder (1998). European Journal of Personality, 13(6), 533-538.

Trapnell, P. D., & Campbell, J. D. (1999). Private self-consciousness and the five-factor model of personality: Distinguishing rumination from reflection. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 76(2), 284-304.

Watson, P. J., Morris, R. J., Ramsey, A., & Hickman, S. E. (1996). Further contrasts between self-reflectiveness and internal state awareness factors of private self-consciousness. Journal of Psychology, 130(2), 183-192.